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Effective GPS Jamming Techniques for UAVs  
Using Low-Cost SDR Platforms 
 




Lately, a rising number of incidents between unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and airplanes 
have been reported in airports and airfields. In order to help cope with the problem of unauthorized 
UAV operations, in this paper we evaluate the use of low cost SDR platforms (software defined 
radio) for the implementation of a jammer able to generate an effective interfering signal aimed 
at the GPS navigation system. Using a programmable BladeRF x40 platform from Nuand and the 
GNU Radio software development toolkit, several interference techniques were studied and 
evaluated, considering the spectral efficiency, energy efficiency and complexity. It was shown 
that the tested approaches are capable of stopping the reliable reception of the radionavigation 
signal in real-life scenarios, neutralizing the capacity for autonomous operation of the vehicle. 





















Although drone legislation exists, many pilots choose to irresponsibly fail to comply with it, 
generating various types of incidents and damaging the image and work of those who daily respect 
the rules and make the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) their professional activity.  Different 
approaches exist for dealing with the problem. For example, Dutch police trained some raptors 
such as eagles so that they are able to chase and hunt down UAVs whenever necessary [1]. 
However, there are great chances that these animals will get injured with the carbon propellers of 
the device, so the police are assessing the need to implement some additional protection. In 
Russia, a new non-destructive weapon was presented capable of solving the problem in question. 
Rex-1 was the solution presented as the emitter of a jammer signal to the GNSS signal. The Rex-
1, in addition to blocking the connection between the device and its controller, sends signals to 
force the landing, also preventing the GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) and Wi-
Fi signal in the zone, so as not to allow reconnection [2]. However, the Rex 1 solution has little 
flexibility and does not interact with other technologies such as spoofing. To help mitigate this 
problem, in this paper we study effective ways to block the GPS signal [3] using low cost SDR 
platforms and thus prevent the autonomous flight of the Global Positioning System of the UAVs. 
The high degree of flexibility of SDR platforms, eases the integration of jamming functionalities 
with others, such as GPS signal spoofing, enabling the implementation of a low-cost 
neutralization system which can be effective against a wide range of UAVs [4]. 
Jamming makes use of intentional radio interferences to harm wireless communications by 
keeping communicating medium busy, causing a transmitter to back-off whenever it senses busy 
wireless medium, or corrupt the signal arriving at the receiver. Jamming mostly targets attacks at 
the physical layer but sometimes cross-layer attacks are possible too. Jammers are malicious 
wireless nodes that cause intentional interference in a wireless network. Depending upon the 
attack strategy, a jammer can either have the same or different capabilities from legitimate nodes 
in the network which they are attacking. The jamming effect of a jammer depends on its radio 
transmitter power, location and influence on the network or the targeted node. A jammer may jam 
a network in various ways to make the jamming as effective as possible. Basically, a jammer can 
be either elementary or advanced depending upon its functionality. For the elementary jammers, 
we can divide them into two subgroups: proactive and reactive. The advanced ones can also be 
classified into two sub-types: function-specific and smart-hybrid. A detailed classification of 
different jammers can be found in [5]. 
There are already a few studies regarding the generation of interference in GNSS signals using 
software defined radio (SDR) platforms, e.g., a system for detection and registration of GNSS 
jamming incidences. The system was developed on the basis of the SDR Ettus B200. The study 
presents also results of tests performed under real conditions [6]. 
The SDR chosen for all tests performed was the Bladerf x40 from Nuand2, as it has all the 
specifications required for the implementation of the systems, with a cost of $420. BladeRF was 
designed for high performance and mobile applications. It is used by industry and academic 
researchers in telecommunications, RADAR, and Magnetic Resonance Imaging applications or 
by researchers looking for flexible, inexpensive hardware for wireless research. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces satellite navigation 
systems. Section 3 describes different techniques to interfere with signals. Application of 
jamming techniques against the GPS signal is presented in section 4. Section 5 describes the 
experimental results followed by the conclusions in section 6. 
 
 
2 https://www.nuand.com/product/bladerf-x40/  
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2 Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) can provide accurate location and timing 
information which are required for various applications, such as in UAV autonomous operations. 
GPS is the most commonly used system in the vast majority of applications, especially in UAVs, 
although there are other systems of positioning. 
 
Main systems that make up GNSS: 
 
● GPS - Global Positioning System - USA, operational since 1995; 
● GLONASS - GLObal'naya NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya System - Russia, started in 1982 
and completed in 1995; 
● GALILEO - ESA EU operational in 2013. 
 
● Space component - GPS 
- 24 satellites (+5) of blocks II, IIA (Advanced) and IIR (Replacement) distributed over 6 orbits; 
- approximately circular orbits with a radius of 26600 km, separated from each other by 60 ° in 
length; 
- 12-hour orbital period (≈11h 58min 26s UTC), which causes the birth of the satellites to occur 
about 4 mins earlier each day; 
- Orbital inclination near 55º, relative to the terrestrial equatorial plane. 
 
● Space component - Glonass 
- 24 Satellites (+3) distributed in 3 orbits; 
- approximately circular orbits with a radius of 25510 km, separated from each other by 110 ° in 
length; 
- Orbital period of 11:15 min sidereal, which causes the birth of the satellites to be given about 
50 mins earlier each day; 
- Orbital inclination close to 64.8º, relative to the terrestrial equatorial plane; 
- Path repeats at the end of 8 sidereal days (the next satellite travels through the orbit of the 
previous satellite). 
 
● Space component - Galileu 
- 30 satellites distributed by 3 orbits; 
- approximately circular orbits with a radius of 30000 km, separated from each other by 120 ° in 
length; 
- Orbital period of 14h 21 min sidereal that causes the birth of the satellites to be given about 2h 
and 24 min later in each day; 
- Orbital slope close to 56º, relative to the terrestrial equatorial plane [7]. 
 
GPS satellites transmit simultaneously several ranging codes and navigation data using binary 
phase-shift keying (BPSK). The GPS signals reach a GPS receiver from a series of satellites in 
terrestrial orbit allowing the positioning through trilateration. This is a method whereby the 
distances to three separate points, in this case satellites, are measured in order to calculate a 
location with an accuracy of only a few meters. 
Each GPS satellite transmits two carrier waves: L1 and L2. They are generated from the 
fundamental frequency of 10.23 MHz, which is multiplied by 154 and 120, respectively. Thus, 
the frequencies (L) and the wavelengths (λ) of L1 and L2 are: 
 
● L1 = 10,23MHz × 154 = 1575,42MHz and λ = 19 cm with a bandwidth of 15.345 MHz 
● L2 = 10,23MHz × 120 = 1227,60MHz and λ = 24 cm with a bandwidth of 11 MHz 
 
L1 is the target frequency for the proposed jammer as it is used by commercial UAVs. L1 is used 
for transmitting the Navigation Message, C/A and P Code. These codes are broadcasted to the 
receivers in the navigation message. In General, GPS satellites transmit three types of 
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information: almanac, ephemeris and timing information. The spectrum representation of the GPS 
signal is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1  Spectrum of GPS signal and thermal noise power [8] 
 
GPS signals are very weak, about 50 W, having about the same power as the TV signals 
transmitted by geostationary satellites. GPS signals suffer interference when they pass through 
most structures. As the satellite antenna diffuses the RF signal evenly over the Earth's surface the 
transmitted energy is attenuated. This is mainly due to free space loss as the transmitted energy 
spreads spatially as it travels to the user (according to the surface of a sphere whose radius is 
increasing). 
The minimum energy level received for users on Earth is -158.5 dBW for L / C code at L1 and -
160 dBW for P code at L2 according to GPS specifications [9]. 
 
3 Radio Frequency Interference 
 
A jammer is a device capable of interfering with the reception of signals, such as those used in 
GNSS systems, mobile communications systems, Wi-Fi, etc. Due to the shared nature of the 
wireless medium, a jammer can easily interfere with a communication channel used by RF 
technologies.  
In order to create a jammer against GPS signals, we can apply techniques exploited in jamming 
for other technologies which can be categorized into five types [10]: 
 
3.1 Barrage Jamming 
 
It is the simplest form of interference and is generally defined as a jammer that transmits noise-
like energy throughout the portion of the spectrum occupied by the target, as shown in Fig. 2 a) . 
It essentially increases the noise level in the receiver, making it difficult to operate the 
communication system. 
 
3.2 Tone Jamming 
 
In this technique, only a sinusoid is transmitted on the same frequency as the carrier of the GPS 
signal. This means that the interference is created only at the central frequency and not over the 
whole bandwidth. Using this technique all energy is applied at the center frequency of the carrier. 




3.3 Sweep Jamming 
 
It is a technique that tries to replicate a behavior very similar to Barrage Jamming because it 
operates over the whole frequency band. The difference between these two techniques is that 
Sweep Jamming does not emit a static signal or a bandwidth of 15.345MHz. This technique is 
more efficient with respect to power spectral density since it emits a low bandwidth signal and 
sweeps the frequency in order to traverse the entire bandwidth of the signal to be interfered with, 
as shown in Fig. 2 c) . It emits a signal known as Chirp Signal [11]. 
 
3.4 Successive Pulses Jamming 
 
This approach consists in the generation of a sequence of pulses in time with low duty cycle. By 
using this technique, the jamming of the carrier wave frequency can be accomplished due to the 
resulting spectrum of the interfering signal, which is shown in Fig. 2 d) . The signal occupies the 
desired band with peaks located at multiples of the frequency of the corresponding pulse 
sequence. 
 
3.5 Protocol-Aware Jamming 
 
The last interference technique presented is protocol-aware congestion. The feasibility of using 
protocol-aware jammers has been studied in IEEE 802.11-based wireless LAN communication 
systems. It was concluded that these can reach interference with very low energy requirements 
and low probability of protocol detection [12, 13]. Protocol-aware jammers also prevent 
interference with other communication systems operating on the same RF band. In this type of 
approach it is a common practice to use a jammer with an architecture similar to that used by the 
emitter of the target signal. In this way, the interfering signal mixes with the target signal using a 
similar spectrum in order to destroy the information thereof or otherwise make its reception 
virtually impossible at the receiver.  
During the construction of the interference signal, the signal modulation (BPSK), the data rate 
(sample rate = 1.023MHz) and the channel bandwidth (15.345MHz) are considered. The resulting 
spectrum is illustrated in Fig. 2 e) . This technique is the one that results in a spectrum closer to 
the spectrum of real GPS signals. 
 
 
Fig. 2 a) Theoretical spectrum of Barrage Jamming;  b) Theoretical spectrum of Tone Jamming;  c) Theoretical 








4 Application of Jamming Techniques in the GPS Signal 
 
In the following, we provide the details of the implementation of the five different jamming 
techniques aimed at the GPS signal. 
 
4.1 Barrage Jamming 
 
The Barrage Jamming, using theoretical information is the best jammer that can be done in the 
absence of any knowledge of the target signal [14]. Blocking wireless networks can be 
accomplished by generating continuous noise with a power above the maximum the system 
supports. The negative side of this approach is the high amount of energy required which 
contributes to a low energy efficiency. Furthermore, it is not possible to select which signals to 
be affected in the RF band used. When applying this technique for GPS signal blocking, this last 
restriction is not an obstacle since what is intended to affect is the entire GPS frequency band. 
The construction of the signal to be transmitted was programmed using the GNU Radio toolkit, 
where Gaussian noise is generated through the Noise Source block (Fig. 3 a) ) and transmitted 
over the entire bandwidth of the L1 band GPS signal with a center frequency of 1.57542 GHz and 
a bandwidth of 14 MHz (Fig. 3 b) ).  
To analyze the power spectral density of the various types of jammers, the receiving antenna is 
connected for a spectrum analysis on the GNU Radio using the osmocom Source block        (Fig. 
3 c) ), connected to the QT GUI Frequency Sink (Fig. 3 d) ). This setting is possible because 
BladeRF is a transceiver. This configuration was adopted for all the techniques presented. 
The BladeRF has a Variable Gain Amplifier (VGA) in the transmit module, TxVGA1 for BB 
(Base Band) Gain and TxVGA2 for RF (Radio Frequency) Gain. Generally, TxVGA1 should be 
increased before TxVGA2. Sliders for these parameters were provided in the GUI via the QT GUI 






Fig. 3  Barrage Jamming programmed in GNU Radio 





Using the osmocom Source block, the block responsible for the reception of the BladeRF, we can 
analyze the signal interconnecting this block to the QT GUI Frequency Sink to represent the 
transmitted signal spectrum (Fig. 4). 
 
Fig. 4  Spectrum resulting from Barrage Jamming 
 
The result in terms of spectrum of transmitted signal is the expected one according to theory, with 
the signal having a bandwidth of 14 MHz and an average power spectral density of -60 dBW / 
Hz. At the center frequency, there is a maximum peak due to the DC Offset problem. This problem 
lies in all the techniques presented below. 
 
 
4.2 Tone Jamming 
 
The Tone Jamming model was developed in GNU Radio, simply generating a sinusoid using 
Signal Source block with select cosine in waveform (Fig. 5 a) ) which is transmitted in the central 
frequency of the GPS, 1.57542GHz (Fig. 5 b) ). 
 
 








The interference results are shown in Fig. 6. This jamming signal does not occupy the entire band 
of the GPS signal which is one of the possible disadvantages since the GPS signal is based on a 
spread spectrum approach which gives it some robustness against narrowband interference. The 
average power spectral density of the transmitted signal is -50 dBW/Hz. 
 
 
Fig. 6  Spectrum resulting from Successive Pulses Jamming 
 
4.3 Sweep Jamming 
 
For the Sweep Jamming technique, it is necessary to create a Chirp Signal, i.e., a signal that 
increases or decreases its frequency over time. The result at the spectrum level corresponds to the 
continuous sweep of a range of frequencies.  
The base construction of the signal to be transmitted was accomplished on GNU Radio according 
to the flowgraph in Fig. 7. It is transmitted with the minimum bandwidth supported by the 
BladeRF, 1.5 MHz (Fig. 7 a) ). Knowing that the bandwidth of the GPS signal is 15,345 MHz, 
the frequency varies between 1.5678 GHz and 1.5831 GHz, with 10 kHz jumps (Fig. 7 b) ) 
calculated as in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2. 
 
     =    −
  
2
= 1.57542 × 10  −
15.345 × 10 
2
= 1.5678     
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15.345 × 10 
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The result in the frequency spectrum at a certain moment is shown in Fig. 8. 
 
Fig. 8  Spectrum resulting from Sweep Jamming 
 
Using this rapid sweeping approach it was observed that the transmitted signal has an average 
power spectral density of -50 dBW/Hz and an overall bandwidth of 15.3 MHz. 
 
Using the  waterfall spectrum from the Sharp SDR tool, Fig. 9, it can be observed that the BladeRF 
is constantly transmitting and there are no perceptible jumps in the frequency because of the fast 
sweeping applied. The analysis of this waterfall is at the carrier frequency, 1575.42 MHz. The 
waterfall plot shows the variation of the frequency spectrum over time. The received power signal 
is declared by the color. Using the scale in right side of Fig. 9 it is possible to analyze the power 




Fig. 9  Waterfall analysis of Sweep Jamming (screenshot obtained from the Sharp SDR software) 
 
4.4 Successive Pulses Jamming 
 
This technique consists of sending a sequence of pulses with low duty cycle, on the GPS signal 
frequency 1.57542 GHz, occupying all its bandwidth, 14 MHz. It was implemented using the flow 






Fig. 10  Successive Pulses Jamming programmed in GNU Radio 
 
In order to generate a low duty cycle signal in time, a vector with the following configuration is 
output: [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1], from the Vector Source block (Fig. 10 a) ). It can be stated that the duty cycle of this signal 
is 2%, as we can see in Fig. 11. 
 
 
Fig. 11  Impulses in time with low duty cycle 
 
The spectrum of the transmitted signal is shown in Fig. 12. Although the Successive Pulse 
Jamming technique takes up the full bandwidth of the GPS signal, it does not do it uniformly 
which may decrease its efficiency as a jammer. The average power spectral density of the 






Fig. 12  Spectrum resulting from Successive Pulses Jamming 
 
4.5 Protocol-Aware Jamming 
 
The composition of the signal to be transmitted is represented in Fig. 13 beginning by creating a 
random source of bits which are converted to float by applying the block UChart To Float (Fig. 
13 a) ). In order to map the ‘0’s and ‘1’s to -1 and 1, respectively, there is a block that multiplies 
the sequence by 2 followed by an addition of -1 (Fig. 13 b) ).  
It is only possible to transmit the signal if it is converted to a sequence of complex valued samples 
(Fig. 13 c) ), since the osmocom Sink block receives only complex values (this is the block 
responsible for interfacing with transmitter of the BladeRF board). The real part of the complex 
sequence carries the modulated signal (Fig. 13 b) ) while the imaginary part is zero, the GPS 
signal L1 is not represented with a quadrature signal (Fig. 13 d) ).  
 
 
Fig. 13  Protocol-Aware Jamming programmed in GNU Radio 
 
The result of the BPSK modulated wave at the receiver, i.e., the jammer signal received with 
AWGN (Additive White Gaussian Noise), is shown in Fig. 14. 
 





Fig. 14  Received Protocol-Aware Jamming signal in Time 
 
The corresponding frequency spectrum is shown in Fig. 15. The average power spectral density 
of the transmitted signal is -60 dBW/Hz. It can be seen that it occupies the intended band with a 
shape similar to the GPS spectrum (i.e. stronger in the areas of the spectrum where the GPS signal 
is also stronger). 
 
 
Fig. 15  Spectrum resulting from Protocol-Aware Jamming 
Another solution for implementing this type of jammer is to transmit a copy of a real GPS signal. 
We tested this approach resorting to a GPS signal simulator and using a message with a 
nonexistent location. The simulator used is GPS-SDR-SIM3 that generates GPS baseband signal 
data streams, which can be converted into RF using Software Defined Radio (SDR) platforms 
such as ADALM-Pluto, BladeRF, HackRF and USRP. 
The message is created through a .txt file and is based on other messages created by the simulator 




The underlined digits are the coordinates of a point that does not exist on the planet Earth and so 
it is possible to shuffle the GPS receiver, translating into a GPS jammer signal. 
The resulting spectrum is shown in Fig. 16, where it is visible that is resembles the one previously 








Fig. 16  Spectrum resulting from Protocol-Aware Jamming 2 
 
5 Experimental Results 
 
5.1 Controlled Environment Tests 
 
In order to evaluate and compare the different GPS jammer signal generation techniques, several 
tests were performed using the previously discussed techniques, considering different distances 
between jammer and target receiver. 
To analyze the power spectral density of the various types of jammers, the receiving antenna was 
connected to the BladeRF for a spectrum analysis on the GNU Radio. This setting is possible due 
to the full duplex support of the BladeRF. The distance between the receiving antenna and the 
transmitting antenna is almost zero (<10cm). Fig. 17 represents the hardware configuration 
adopted for implemented jammers. 
 
Fig. 17  Emitter block diagram (jammer) 
 
Table 1 presents some power spectral density measurements obtained with the five techniques. 
The values selected for the gains TxVGA1 and TxVGA2 were -4 dBW and 25 dBW respectively. 





Table 1  Spectral power density 








The measured power output matches the expected ones, where the lowest values are those of 
Barrage Jamming and Successive Pulses Jamming, because they use all the GPS frequency range, 
14 MHz. The fact that Successive Pulses Jamming achieves a slightly higher value than Barrage 
Jamming is because, even though it occupies 14 MHz, it does not do it evenly. Although Protocol-
Aware Jamming also uses the 14 MHz of bandwidth it concentrates more energy in the center 
frequency than Barrage Jamming and Successive Pulses Jamming. For that reason it achieves 
higher peak on the power spectral density. Jamming Tone is the one that has a high-power density 
concentrated in a small area of the spectrum. Sweep Jamming in theory should get values equal 
to Tone Jamming, since they are the same, although Sweep Jamming sweeps the frequency. This 
does not happen due to the DC Offset error effect. To ensure that the conditions of the various 
tests are the same, it was decided to not use the actual GPS signals but to transmit a false GPS 
signal. This is to ensure that the intensity and reception quality is always the same, as throughout 
the day these two factors change using the actual GPS signals due to the orbital motion of the 
satellites. The GPS signals were generated. 
A GPS transmitting ephemeris file specifies the constellation of GPS satellites to use. The 
ephemeris contains information regarding the position and the clock error of the satellites required 
in the positioning. 
Fig. 18 shows the setup employed for the tests, where it is shown the adopted GPS receiver as 
well as a second BladeRF board used for the emission of the false GPS signal. 
 
 
Fig. 18  Block diagram reference setup comprising a GPS receiver and false GPS transmitter (BladeRF) 
 
The receiver used for the tests, shown in Fig. 18, is the ublox receiver shown in Fig. 19. The GPS 
receiver antenna is connected to the u-blox module and it is connected to the computer as shown 
at the top of Fig. 18. The distance between the receiving antenna and the transmitting antenna 







Barrage Jamming -28 dBW/Hz -60 dBW/Hz 
Sweep Jamming -8 dBW/Hz -50 dBW/Hz 
Successive Pulses Jamming -24 dBW/Hz -70 dBW/Hz 
Tone Jamming 2 dBW/Hz -50 dBW/Hz 








Fig. 19  Ublox receiver (EVK-M8T) 
 
For the tests it was important to transmit the simulated GPS signal using a realistic power, 
considering the typical power received by an actual GPS signal. For this we used the following 
approach. 
 
The process begins with the GNSS signal propagating through space until arrives at the user's 
GNSS receiving antenna. The power received is extremely poor, corresponding to a guaranteed 
signal power of -160 dBW in the case of the Global Positioning System (GPS). Considering a 
bandwidth of 2 MHz (the approximate null-to-null bandwidth of the GPS C/A code signal), the 
power of the received GPS signal is actually lower than the thermal noise power, as defined by 
Eq. 3 [8]. Furthermore, various terminologies used in this section are illustrated in Table 2. 
 
 
               =   .  .     ( ) 
 
Table 2  Variables used 









Applying the bandwidth of 2 MHz and assuming a temperature of 290 K results in  
 
  ℎ            = 1.38 × 10
−23 × 290 × 2 × 106 = 8 × 10−15   
 
which can be also expressed in dB as 
  ℎ            = 10 log 8 × 10
−15  = −140.97    
Knowing that the transmission powers of the GPS satellites lie between 20 W and 50 W, with a 
transmission antenna with a gain of 12 dB [15] and that the satellites are located 20200 km high 
(90 ° elevation), the maximum power received on the earth's surface is calculated using the free 
space path loss equation  
Terminology  Explanation 
    Boltzmann constant in joules per kelvin [J/K] 
  Absolute resistance temperature in kelvins [K] 
    Bandwidth in hertz over which noise is measured [Hz] 
  Wavelength [m] 
c Speed of light [m/s] 
   Signal frequency [Hz] 















    
Inserting all the specified values into Eq. 6 we obtain  
    =





  = 1.78 × 10
    
 
which can be written in dB as 
 
    = 10 log  ( ) = 10 log  (1.78 × 10
  ) = 182.5     
 
 The maximum power emitted by the GPS satellite in dBW is 
       (  ) = 10 log  (50) = 17     
 
Considering the power transmitted and taking into account the losses in free space previously 
calculated, one can easily compute the power received using  
    =      +     −     = 17 + 12 − 182.5 =  −153.5     
 
The BladeRF with a gain      1 = −4    and      1    = 5    [16] results in a false GPS 
signal with -122 dBW of power, measured with the BladeRF without any type of filtering. For 
the signal to have a power of -153.5 dBW adjustments are required. 
 
Without the VGA1 emission and reception gains, -122 - (-4) - 5 = -123 dBW. The TxVGA1 gain 
adjustment can also be set to -35 dB, losing 31 dB compared to the previous case (-4-31 = -35 
dB). Adding the loss of 31 dB applied through the gain adjustment TxVGA1, results in a received 
power of -122 -31 = -153 dBW. The GPS receiver and the false GPS transmitter must be located 
close to each other and with a TxVGA1 setting = -35 dB, so that the received signal power can 
be close to the received signal power in a real case.  
  
In the first evaluation phase, maximum range tests were performed for each of the jammers 
studied in a controlled environment (Table 3). 
Based on the results, a conclusion cannot yet be reached, although the best-performing jammers 
are Barrage Jamming, Sweep Jamming and Protocol-Aware Jamming, with a maximum range of 
25 meters. Successive Pulses Jamming managed to interfere only up to 5 meters away with the 
receiver. The Tone Jamming achieved a maximum range of 20 meters. 
 
 
Table 3  Maximum range  



















Barrage Jamming ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Sweep Jamming ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Successive Pulses Jamming ✓ × × × × 
Tone Jamming ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × 
Protocol-Aware Jamming ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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The five techniques presented have advantages and disadvantages which are presented next, 
before the experimental tests in a realistic environment. 
Barrage Jamming has as its main advantage the capability to jam the entire GPS signal band. The 
major problem is the power resource, since the power distributes evenly inside the bandwidth of 
15,345 MHz which can result in a low power spectral density at every frequency. 
The Tone Jamming only emits a sinusoid at the center frequency, concentrating all the energy on 
the carrier frequency of the GPS signals but in practice this is not the case because the LimeMicro 
LMS6002D chip, which is responsible for the BladeRF emission, has a minimum emission 
bandwidth of 1.5 MHz, bandwidth than the jammer. The great advantage is to concentrate all your 
energy on the carrier frequency of the GPS signals. 
It will be expected that the technique is not one of the most effective but has the advantage of 
simplicity in terms of signal generation. 
The great advantage of Sweep Jamming is the ability to apply a power spectral density which, 
can momentarily become much higher than Barrage Jamming on a specific frequency, using a 
signal with a lower bandwidth. As the bandwidth of the signal is smaller, the signal power does 
not disperse and is more concentrated around the central frequency of the signal which can be 
changed over time. This technique uses a frequency sweep so that it is possible to cover the entire 
bandwidth of the GPS signal. The disadvantage is the need for the hardware to support frequency 
sweeping fast enough for this technique to succeed. 
Successive Pulses Jamming can also obtain higher power spectral density values than the Barrage 
Jamming, because although it occupies the entire bandwidth of the GPS signal, it does not do so 
uniformly. The fact that jamming spacing between frequencies exists throughout the entire band 
of the GPS signal is a disadvantage since the receiver may be able to recover the GPS signal. 
Finally, Protocol-Aware Jamming (BPSK random signal created using GNU Radio or using GPS-
SDR-SIM is the same results) has a very similar behavior to Barrage Jamming, although this does 
not consist of noise emitting itself, but random bits modulated in BPSK. Setting the identical 
sample rate to GPS, makes the Protocol-Aware Jamming spectrum very similar to that of GPS. 
 
5.2 Real Environment Tests 
 
The aim of the second phase of the tests was to evaluate the performance of the jamming 
techniques with real GPS signals. 
The Barrage Jamming is used as the  reference technique against which the other jammers are 
compared. The tests consist of first evaluating the maximum distance at which the Barrage 
Jamming can interfere in the real environment. The maximum range obtained for the Barrage 
Jamming was 18 meters. This distance was defined as the reference range so that if we could 
place the receiver farther from the jammer, as shown in Fig. 20, we could then conclude that 
specific jammers had a higher range than Barrage Jamming. For these tests, the BladeRF was 
powered by USB 3.0, with gains of TxVGA1 = -4 dB and TxVGA2 = 25 dB.  
 
 
Fig. 20  Test in real environment 
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The Successive Pulses Jamming as expected failed to interfere with the receiver. The fact that 
there is not a complete coverage of all frequencies throughout the bandwidth of the GPS signal 
makes this technique inefficient. 
 
The Tone Jammer can interfere with the receiver by lowering all power levels of the satellites but 
still, it was not able to continuously maintain the inhibition of the localization functionality of the 
receiver. It is important to remind that this technique does not occupy uniformly all the bandwidth 
of the GPS. 
 
Sweep Jamming and Protocol-Aware Jamming (BPSK random signal created using GNU Radio 
or using GPS-SDR-SIM achieved the same results) were able to block the GPS signals at the 
receiver and were shown to be more efficient techniques compared to Barrage Jamming. 
 
On the basis of these results, these two techniques merit a more detailed analysis. Both can cause 
the receiver to fail to determine the location, although the analysis of signal strengths of the GPS 





Fig. 21  Power of GPS satellite signals with Sweep Jamming (screenshot obtained from the U-Center software) 
 




The graphs presented in both figures relate the received power level (vertical axis) and the time 
instants on the horizontal axis (each square corresponds to 1 second), with the oldest being 
represented on the left and the current on the right. The graphs of Fig. 21 and Fig. 22 were 
constructed using the u-center software tool. It is possible to observe that with Sweep Jamming 
the received power associated to each satellite never vanishes completely, whereas in Protocol-
Aware Jamming as soon as the jammer is activated, the powers of the satellites gradually diminish 
in the following instants of time until they completely disappear for all satellites. It was concluded 
that Protocol-Aware Jamming was the most viable jammer in terms of its scope compared to the 
rest. Sweep Jamming is also a simple and effective solution, but the equipment can limit the 
efficiency of the technique approached. If the hardware does not allow a frequency sweep that is 
sufficiently fast jamming effectivity cannot be guaranteed. 
Once we found the best jammer, we used it to test over a drone in flight. The drones used for the 
real-life tests were the DJI Spark and Parrot Bebop 2 FPV. In both cases similar behavior was 
observed. Selecting the auto flight mode and with the drone already in flight, whenever the 
jammer signal transmission was started, the drone's behavior automatically changed, stoping its 
flight path and gliding in the same place. It was observed that the time between starting jammer 
transmission and drone gliding is almost instantaneous. If the jammer is started before the drone 
takes off, the drone will not even perform any action. All tests were performed safely, away from 
air traffic and outside prohibited areas. Although it was not exploited in the paper, after the drone 
halts its operation due to jamming it could then be possible to emit spoofing signals so that the 
drone is deflected and indirectly controlled. Fig. 23 shows a prototype of an unauthorized drone 
protection system, which includes the proposed jamming solution. 
 
Fig. 23 Unauthorized drone protection system 
6 Conclusions 
 
This paper compares five possible techniques capable to interfere with GPS signals resulting in 
the possible loss of localization and navigation capabilities of a UAV. 
The different techniques were implemented and evaluated using low-cost SDR platforms and the 
GNU Radio software development toolkit. Several tests were performed in order to evaluate the 
effectivity in accomplishing the jamming of GPS signals. 
The best-performing jammer was Protocol-Aware Jamming (Fig. 22) which uses an architecture 
similar to that used by a transmitter of GPS signals. Using this approach, the interfering signal 
mixes more effectively with the main signal since they exhibit identical spectral behavior, making 
its reception virtually impossible to perform at the receiver with lower transmitter power required. 






This work was funded by FCT/MEC through national funds and co-funded by FEDER – PT2020 





1. Thuy Ong, “Dutch police will stop using drone-hunting eagles since they weren't doing what they're told”, Dec. 2017 [Online]. 
Available: https://www.theverge.com/2017/12/12/16767000/police-netherlands-eagles-rogue-drones. [Accessed: 11-Jan-2018]. 
2. Army Recognition, “New Russian Rex-1 anti-drone rifle system ready to be tested- weapons defence industry military 
technology UK” , October 2017 [Online]. Available: https://www.armyrecognition.com/ 
weapons_defence_industry_military_technology_uk/new_russian_rex-1_anti-drone_rifle_system_ready_to_be_tested.html  
[Accessed: 11-Jan-2018]. 
3. H. Hu, N. Wei, “A study of GPS jamming and anti-jamming” Published in: 2009 2nd International Conference on Power 
Electronics and Intelligent Transportation System (PEITS). 
4. M. Kratky, V. Minarik, “The non-destructive methods of fight against UAVs” - Published in: 2017 International Conference on 
Military Technologies (ICMT). 
5. K. Grover, A. Lim, Q. Yang, “Jamming and anti-jamming techniques in wireless networks: a survey” - International Journal of 
Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing, 2014 Vol.17 No.4, pp.197 – 215. 
6. K. Bożek, A. Perski, A. Wieczyński, M. Baczyńska-Wilkowska, “Detection of GNSS Jamming Incidence” - Part of the Advances 
in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 743), 2018. 
7. Faculdade de ciências da universidade de lisboa - DEGGE- hidrografia, “GNSS and Earth Observation: recent results and 
challenges”,2013. 
8. what-when-how - In Depth Tutorials and Information, “GNSS Antennas and Front Ends (GPS and Galileo Receiver) Part 1” 
[Online]. Available: http://what-when-how.com/a-software-defined-gps-and-galileo-receiver/gnss-antennas-and-front-ends-
gps-and-galileo-receiver-part-1/. [Accessed: 14-July-2018]. 
9. P. Misra and P. Enge, Global Positioning System: Signals, Measurements and Performance. Lincoln, Massachusetts: Ganga-
Jamuna Press, 2010. 
10. K. Pärlin, “Jamming of Spread Spectrum Communications used in UAV Remote Control Systems”, Tallinn University of 
Technology, School of Information Technologies, Thomas Johann Seebeck Department of Electronics 2017. 
11. S. Smith, “The Scientist and Engineer's Guide to Digital Signal Processing” Chapter 11: Fourier Transform Pairs/ Chirp Signals. 
12. A. Hussain, N. Saqib, U. Qamar, M. Zia,  H. Mahmood, “Protocol-aware radio frequency jamming in Wi-Fi and commercial 
wireless networks”. Journal of communications and networks, 16(4):397–406, 2014. 
13. David Thuente and Mithun Acharya. Intelligent jamming in wireless networks with applications to 802.11 b and other networks. 
In Proc. of MILCOM, volume 6, page 100, 2006. 
14. Tamer Basar. The gaussian test channel with an intelligent jammer. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 29(1):152–157, 
January 1983. 
15. Global Position System Low Noise Amplifier. GPS, LNA, Sensitivity, Jamming, Cohabitation, TTFF. NXP founded by Philips. 
Date of release: May 2009. 
16. bladeRF Power Consumption - FX3 GPIF, FPGA, and RF Active - bladeRF x40 - 
https://github.com/Nuand/bladeRF/wiki/bladeRF-Power-Consumption. [Accessed: 12-Mar-2018]. 
 
 
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. 
